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Abstract. With the development of grids, distributed applications are
spread across multiple computing resources and require eﬃcient secu-
rity mechanisms among the processes. Although protocols for authen-
ticated group Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange protocols seem to be the
natural mechanisms for supporting these applications, current solutions
are either limited by the use of public key infrastructures or by their
scalability, requiring a number of rounds linear in the number of group
members. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose in this paper the
ﬁrst provably-secure password-based constant-round group key exchange
protocol. It is based on the protocol of Burmester and Desmedt and is
provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models, under the
Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption. The new protocol is very eﬃcient
and fully scalable since it only requires four rounds of communication
and four multi-exponentiations per user. Moreover, the new protocol
avoids intricate authentication infrastructures by relying on passwords
for authentication.
Keywords. Password-based Authentication, Group Key Exchange.
1 Introduction
Motivation. Modern distributed applications often need to maintain consis-
tency of replicated information and coordinate the activities of many processes.
Collaborative applications and distributed computations are both examples of
these types of applications. With the development of grids [12], distributed com-
putations are spread across multiple computing resources requiring eﬃcient se-
curity mechanisms between the processes. Although protocols for group Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange [5,7,6,8] provide a natural mechanism for supporting
these applications, these protocols are limited in their scalability due to a num-
ber of rounds linear in the number of group members. An alternative is to use a
protocol for group key exchange that runs in a constant number or rounds [11,15,
16]. The two measures of a protocol’s eﬃciency are the computational cost per2 M. Abdalla et al.
member and the communication complexity (number of protocol rounds) of the
given protocol. Since the Moore’s laws has told us that computing power grows
faster than communication power, it is therefore natural to trade communication
power for computing power in a group key exchange protocol.
A password is the ideal authentication means to exchange a session key in
the absence of public-key infrastructures or pre-distributed symmetric keys. In a
group, the sharing of a password among the members greatly simpliﬁes the setup
of distributed applications [7,11]. An example of distributed applications could
simply be the networking of all the devices attached to a human. Low-entropy
passwords are easy for humans to remember, but cannot of course guarantee the
same level of security as high-entropy secrets such as symmetric or asymmetric
keys. The most serious attack against a password-based protocol is the so-called
dictionary attack: the attacker recovers the password and uses it to imperson-
ate the legitimate user. The low-entropy feature makes the job of the attacker
easier since the attacker (oﬀ-line) runs through all the possible passwords in or-
der to obtain partial information and to maximize his success probability. The
minimum required from a protocol is security against this attack.
Contributions. In the present paper, we study the problem of scalable pro-
tocols for authenticated group Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange. Many researchers
have studied and found solutions to this problem in the context of a Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI), yet a (secure) solution had to be found in the context of
a (short) password shared among the members of the group. Two attempts in
this direction are due to Dutta and Barua [11] and to Lee, Hwang, and Lee [17].
Unfortunately, adding authentication services to a group key exchange protocol
is a not trivial since redundancy in the ﬂows of the protocol can open the door
to diﬀerent forms of attacks. In fact, in Section 3, we brieﬂy describe attacks
against the schemes of Dutta and Barua [11] and of Lee, Hwang, and Lee [17].
Then, in Section 4, we show how to add password-authentication services to the
Burmester and Desmedt scheme [9,10]. Our protocol is provably secure in the
random-oracle [4] and ideal-cipher models [3] under the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
assumption.
Related Work. Following the work of Bresson et al. on the group Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange problem [5,7,6,8], several researchers have developed sim-
ilar protocols but that run in a constant number of rounds. Katz and Yung [15]
added authentication services to the original Burmester and Desmedt’s proto-
col [9,10]. Later, Kim, Lee and Lee extended the work of Katz and Yung to take
into account the notion of dynamicity in the membership [16]. The problem of
adding password-authentication services followed shortly after. In [7], Bresson et
al. proposed the ﬁrst solution to the group Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange problem
in the password-based scenario. Their protocol, however, has a total number of
rounds which is linear in the total number of players in the group. In [11,17], two
diﬀerent password-based versions of Burmester-Desmedt protocol were proposed
along with proofs in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models. Unfortunately,
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Outline of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
recall the security model usually used for password-based group Diﬃe-Hellman
key exchange. This model was previously deﬁned in [7], but also takes advantage
of [1]. In Section 3 we recall Burmester-Desmedt scheme and describe attacks
against the schemes of Dutta and Barua [11] and of Lee, Hwang, and Lee [17].
In Section 4, we describe the mechanics behind our protocol. In Section 5, we
show that our protocol is provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher
models under the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption.
2 Security Model
2.1 Password-Based Authentication
In the password-based authentication setting, we assume each player holds a
password pw drawn uniformly at random from the dictionary Password of size
N. This secret of low-entropy (N is often assumed to be small, i.e. typically less
than a million) will be used to authenticate the parties to each other
Unfortunately, one cannot prevent an adversary to choose randomly a pass-
word in the dictionary and to try to impersonate a player. However such on-line
exhaustive search (even if N is not so large) can easily be limited by requiring a
minimal time interval between successive failed attempts or locking an account
after a threshold of failures. Security against such active attacks is measured in
the number of passwords the adversary can “erase” from the candidate list after
a failure.
On the other hand, oﬀ-line exhaustive search cannot be limited by such prac-
tical behaviors or computational resources considerations. Hopefully, they can
be prevented if the protocol is carefully designed and ensures that no information
about the password can leak from passively eavesdropped transcripts, but also
from active attacks.
2.2 Formal Deﬁnitions
We denote by U1,...,Un the parties that can participate in the key exchange
protocol P. Each of them may have several instances called oracles involved in
distinct, possibly concurrent, executions of P. We denote Ui instances by U
j
i .
The parties share a low-entropy secret pw which is uniformly drawn from a small
dictionary Password of size N.
The key exchange algorithm P is an interactive protocol between the Ui’s
that provides the instances with a session key sk. During the execution of this
protocol, the adversary has the entire control of the network, and tries to break
the privacy of the key.
Remark 1 In the “constant-round” protocols that we will study, simultane-
ous broadcasts are intensively used. However we do not make any assumption
about the correctness of the latter primitive: it is actually a multi-cast, in which
the adversary may delay, modify, or cancel the message sent to each recipient
independently.4 M. Abdalla et al.
In the usual security model [7], several queries are available to the adversary
to model his capability. We however enhance it with the Real-or-Random no-
tion for the semantic security [1] instead of the Find-then-Guess. This notion is
strictly stronger in the password-based setting. And actually, since we focus on
the semantic security only, we can assume that each time a player accepts a key,
the latter is revealed to the adversary, either in a real way, or in a random one
(according to a bit b). Let us brieﬂy review each query:
– Send(U
j
i ,m): This query enables to consider active attacks by having A send-
ing a message to any instance U
j
i . The adversary A gets back the response U
j
i
generates in processing the message m according to the protocol P. A query
Send(Start) initializes the key exchange algorithm, and thus the adversary
receives the initial ﬂows sent out by the instance.
– Test
b(U
j
i ): This query models the misuse of the session key by instance Ui
(known-key attacks). The query is only available to A if the attacked instance
actually “holds” a session key. It either releases the actual key to A, if b = 1
or a random one, if b = 0. The random keys must however be consistant
between users in the same session. Therefore, a random key is simulated by
the evaluation of a random function on the view a user has of the session:
all the partners have the same view, they thus have the same random key
(but independent of the actual view.)
Remark 2 Note that it has been shown [1] that this query is indeed enough
to model known-key attacks —where Reveal queries, which always answer
with the real keys, are available—, and makes the model even stronger. Even
though their result has only been proven in the two-party and three-party
scenarios, one should note that their proof can be easily extended to the
group scenario.
As already noticed, the aim of the adversary is to break the privacy of the
session key (a.k.a., semantic security). This security notion takes place in the
context of executing P in the presence of the adversary A. One ﬁrst draws a
password pw from Password, ﬂips a coin b, provides coin tosses to A, as well as
access to the Test
b and Send oracles.
The goal of the adversary is to guess the bit b involved in the Test queries,
by outputting this guess b′. We denote the AKE advantage as the probability
that A correctly guesses the value of b. More precisely we deﬁne Adv
ake
P (A) =
2Pr[b = b′]−1. The protocol P is said to be (t,ǫ)-AKE-secure if A’s advantage
is smaller than ǫ for any adversary A running with time t.
2.3 On the Simpliﬁcation of the Model
In previous models, Execute queries were introduced to model passive eaves-
dropping. However, they can easily be simulated using the Send queries. In our
analysis, we reﬁne the way to deal with the adversary possible behaviors. We will
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without including those he has just forwarded). This number upper-bounds the
number of on-line “tests” the adversary performs to guess the password. And
we denote by qsession the total number of sessions the adversary has initiated:
nqsession, where n is the size of the group, upper-bounds the total number of mes-
sages the adversary has sent in the protocol (including those he has built and
those he has just forwarded). We emphasize that this is stronger than consider-
ing only Execute and Send queries: while being polynomially equivalent, the two
models are not tightly equivalent, since the adversary does not need to know in
advance if he will forward all the ﬂows, or be active when a new session starts.
Moreover, suppressing the Execute queries makes the model even simpler.
The best we can expect with such a scheme is that the adversary erases no
more than 1 password for each session in which he plays actively (since there
exists attacks which achieve that in any password-based scheme.) However, in
our quite eﬃcient scheme, we can just prevent the adversary from erasing more
than 1 password for each player he tries to impersonate (we will even show our
proof is almost optimal.)
3 Preliminaries
The best starting point for an eﬃcient password-based group key exchange,
and namely if one wants a constant-round protocol, is the scheme proposed by
Burmester and Desmedt [9,10] at Eurocrypt 94 and later formally analyzed by
Katz and Yung in 2003 [15].
3.1 The Burmester and Desmedt Protocol
In the Burmester-Desmedt scheme, one considers a cyclic group G generated by
g, in which the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds. The protocol
works as follows, where all the indices are taken modulo n (between 1 and n),
and n is the size of the group:
– Each player Ui chooses a random exponent xi and broadcasts zi = gxi;
– Each player computes the Zi = z
xi
i−1 and Zi+1 = z
xi+1
i = z
xi
i+1, and broad-
casts Xi = Zi+1/Zi;
– Each player computes his session key as Ki = Zn
i X
n−1
i X
n−2
i+1    Xi+n−2.
It is easy to see that for any i, we have Ki =
Qj=n
j=1 Zj = gx1x2+x2x3+   +xnx1.
3.2 A Naive Password-Based Approach
We immediately note that encrypting values in the second round would lead to
a trivial dictionary attack, since the product of all values is equal to 1. One may
want to enhance the Burmester and Desmedt’s protocol by using a password pw
to “mask” the ﬁrst round only. One then comes up to the simple protocole, using
a mask of the form hpw, where h is another generator of the group G, whose
discrete logarithm in the base g is unknown [2]:6 M. Abdalla et al.
– Each player Ui chooses a random exponent xi, computes zi = gxi and broad-
casts z⋆
i = zihpw;
– Each player extracts zi−1 and zi+1, and computes the Zi = z
xi
i−1 and Zi+1 =
z
xi+1
i = z
xi
i+1. He then broadcasts Xi = Zi+1/Zi;
– Each player computes his secret as Ki = Zn
i X
n−1
i X
n−2
i+1    Xi+n−2
Thereafter, one can add any key conﬁrmation and/or any intricate key extrac-
tion (even in the random oracle model, such as ski = H(View,Ki)), but it does
not help. Indeed, the homomorphic property of this “masking” technique allows
active attacks from the adversary: Assume that the adversary impersonates play-
ers U1 and U3 and sends for the ﬁrst round z⋆
1 = gu1 and z⋆
3 = gu3, for known
values u1 and u3. On the second round, the adversary waits for receiving X2
from player U2:
X2 =
￿
z3
z1
￿x2
= gx2(u3−u1) =
￿ z2
hpw
￿u3−u1
.
Then one knows that hpw = z2/X
(u1−u3)
−1
2 , which can be easily checked oﬀ-line:
a dictionary attack.
Furthermore, one can be easily convinced that any mechanism such as proof
of knowledge, commitments, etc. to “enforce” the adversary to properly construct
his values are useless against this attack, since in the above attack, the adversary
plays “honestly”.
3.3 The Dutta and Barua Protocol
Dutta and Barua [11] proposed a variant of the Kim-Lee-Lee protocol [16] pre-
sented at Asiacrypt ’04. It makes use of the ideal-cipher model, instead of a
simple mask as above, and is claimed to be secure against dictionary attacks:
– Each player Ui chooses a random exponent xi, as well as a random key ki,
computes zi = gxi, and broadcasts z⋆
i = Epw(zi);
– Each player extracts zi−1 and zi+1, and computes the KL
i = H(z
xi
i−1) =
H(gxi−1xi) and KR
i = H(z
xi+1
i ) = H(z
xi
i+1) = H(gxixi+1). For i = 1,...,n−1,
Ui computes Xi = KL
i ⊕ KR
i , while Un computes Xn = kn ⊕ KR
n ; For
i = 1,...,n − 1, Ui broadcasts E′
pw(ki Xi), while Un broadcasts E′′(Xn);
– After decryption, they can all recover all the ki, and then the common session
key is set as sk = H(k1 ... kn).
Unfortunately, their protocol contains another source of redundancy that
can be exploited by an attacker: the encryption algorithm of all users use the
password as their encryption key. Therefore, a simple attack against their scheme
runs as follows: the adversary plays the role of user U3, with honest users U1
and U2. When the adversary receives z⋆
1 = Epw(z1) and z⋆
2 = Epw(z2), he sets
z⋆
3 = Z⋆
1, sends it to users U1 and U2, and waits for their responses. Note that
setting z⋆
3 = Z⋆
1 implicitly sets x3 = x1. At this point, the adversary knows that
KL
2 = H(gx1x2) and KR
2 = H(gx2x3) = H(gx1x2), and thus X2 = 0k (where k isPassword-based Group Key Exchange in a Constant Number of Rounds 7
the output length of the function H). Upon receiving E′
pw(k2 X2) from U2, he
can perform an oﬀ-line dictionary attack that immediately leads to the correct
password, since this will be the only one decrypting this value to k2 0k.
This conﬁrms the fact that converting a provably-secure scheme into a pass-
word-based protocol is not a simple task. The main problem we observe with
the above scheme is the unique way in which the initial messages of all users are
encrypted, allowing attacks where one player can easily replay messages from
another player. Thus, to avoid problems such as these, one should at least make
sure that the encryption key used by each user is unique to that user. In fact,
this is one of the features of the protocol that we present in the next section.
3.4 The Lee-Hwang-Lee Protocol
In [17], Lee, Hwang, and Lee proposed another password-based version of the
Burmester-Desmedt protocol, which makes use of the random-oracle and ideal-
cipher models. Let E be an ideal cipher and let H and H′ be random oracles.
Their protocol works as follows:
– Each player Ui chooses a random exponent xi, computes zi = gxi, and
broadcasts (Ui,z⋆
i = Epw(zi));
– Each player Ui extracts zi−1 and zi+1, computes Ki = H(z
xi
i+1) = H(gxixi+1),
Ki−1 = H(z
xi
i−1) = H(gxi−1xi), wi = Ki−1 ⊕ Ki, and broadcasts (Ui,wi).
– Each player Ui ﬁrst computes the values Kj = H(gxj−1xj) for j = 1,...,n,
using the values wj that were broadcasted in the second round. Next, each
player Ui sets sk = H′(H(gx1x2) ... H(gxn−1xn) H(gxnx1)) as the common
session key.
To show that the protocol above is not secure, we present the following simple
attack against the semantic security of the session key. First, we start two sessions
with player U1 using {U1,...,U4} as the group. Let x1 and x′
1 be the correspond-
ing values chosen by the two instances of player U1 in each of these sessions and
let (U1,z⋆
1 = Epw(gx1)) and (U1,z′⋆
1 = Epw(gx
′
1)) be the corresponding values out-
putted by these instances. For the instance that outputted (U1,z⋆
1), we provide
to it the values (U2,z′⋆
1), (U3,z⋆
1), and (U4,z′⋆
1), as the ﬁrst-round messages of
players U2, U3, and U4. This implicitly makes K1 = K2 = K3 = K4 = H(gx
′
1x1).
Likewise, for the instance that outputted (U1,z′⋆
1 ), we provide to it the values
(U2,z⋆
1), (U3,z′⋆
1), and (U4,z⋆
1), as the ﬁrst-round messages of players U2, U3,
and U4. This implicitly makes K′
1 = K′
2 = K′
3 = K′
4 = H(gx
′
1x1). As a result,
w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = 0 and w′
1 = w′
2 = w′
3 = w′
4 = 0 and, thus, we can easily
compute the appropriate second-round messages for players U2, U3, and U4 in
both sessions. Moreover, the session keys of these two sessions are the same.
Thus, we can ask test queries to both instances of player U1 and check whether
we get back the same value. This should be the case whenever the output of test
oracle is the actual session key.8 M. Abdalla et al.
4 Our protocol
As above, we use the ideal-cipher model. The latter considers a family of random
permutations Ek : G → G indexed by a ℓH-bit key k which are accessible (as well
as their inverses) through oracle queries (E and D). Here we use the password,
together with nonces, and the index of the user, to encrypt the values in the
ﬁrst round. Other values are sent in the clear. Also a preliminary round is used
during which each player chooses random nonces to be used. This will be crucial
to deﬁne sessions, and then link the encrypted values all together.
Key generations (for the symmetric encryption E, and for the session key) will
make use of hash functions H : {0,1}⋆ → {0,1}ℓH and G : {0,1}⋆ → {0,1}ℓG.
Key conﬁrmations will apply the function Auth : {0,1}⋆ → {0,1}ℓAuth.
4.1 Description
The protocol runs as follows:
1. Each player Ui chooses a random nonce Ni and broadcasts (Ui,Ni);
2. The session S = U1 N1 ... Ui Ni ... Un Nn is then deﬁned, in which each
player has a speciﬁc index i, and a speciﬁc symmetric key ki = H(S,i,pw).
Each player Ui chooses a random exponent xi and broadcasts z⋆
i = Eki(zi),
where zi = gxi;
3. Each player extracts zi−1 = Dki−1(z⋆
i−1) and zi+1 = Dki+1(z⋆
i+1), and com-
putes the Zi = z
xi
i−1 and Zi+1 = z
xi+1
i = z
xi
i+1. He then broadcasts Xi =
Zi+1/Zi;
4. Each player computes his secret as Ki = Zn
i X
n−1
i X
n−2
i+1    Xi+n−2, and
broadcasts his key conﬁrmation Authi = Auth(S,{z⋆
j,Xj}j,Ki,i).
5. After having received and checked all the key conﬁrmations, each player
deﬁned is session key as ski = G(S,{z⋆
j,Xj,Authj}j,Ki).
4.2 Security Theorem
Here we present the main security result of this paper, whose proof appears in
Section 5.
Theorem 3 Let P the above protocol in which the password is chosen in a
dictionary of size N. Then for any adversary A running in time t, that makes at
most qactive attempts within at most qSession sessions, his advantage in breaking
the semantic security of the session key, in the ideal-cipher model, is upper-
bounded by:
Adv
ake
P (t) ≤
2qactive
N
+ 4qsessionnAdv
ddh
G (t) +
2q2
G
2ℓG +
2q2
Auth
2ℓAuth
+
8qG + 2qAuth + 2qD + 2nqEqsession + (qE + qD)2
|G|
+
2qH(qH + qD)
2ℓH
where qG,qH,qAuth,qE,qD denote the number of oracle queries the adversary is
allowed to make to the random oracles G, H and Auth, and to the ideal-cipher
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This theorem states that the security of the session key is protected against
dictionary attacks: the advantage of the adversary essentially grows linearly with
the number of active attempts that the adversary makes (i.e., the number of
messages that the adversary builds by himself). While the number of sessions
includes both active attacks and passive ones (i.e., the session transcripts A
passively eavesdropped), the theorem shows that these passive attacks are es-
sentially negligible: a honest transcript does not help a computationally bounded
adversary in guessing the password.
4.3 On the tightness of Theorem 3
Clearly, Theorem 3 ensures that when building a message by himself, the adver-
sary cannot “test” more than one password per message. Actually, in the proof,
we use qactive to upper-bound the number of players the adversary tries to im-
personate and thus the number of diﬀerent passwords he can inject. Hence, we
achieve a stronger security result than the one claimed in Theorem 3. However, it
leaves open the possibility of whether an adversary can test several passwords in
the same session. Since one may wonder whether a security proof with a tighter
reduction could be found, here we present an online dictionary attack against
our scheme that shows that this is not the case. More precisely, we exhibit an
online dictionary attack in which the adversary can test several passwords in the
same session (but still no more than one password for each message!). The idea
behind the attack is to create a session in which the number of dishonest players
(whose roles are played by the adversary) is twice the number of honest players
and to surround each of the honest players with two dishonest players.
Let k be the number of honest players. The attack works as follows. First,
the adversary starts a session in which all the honest players have indices of
the form 3(i − 1) + 2 for i = 1,...,k. Then, let {pw1,...,pwk} be a list of
candidate passwords that an adversary wants to try and let i′ = 3(i − 1). To
test whether pwi for i = 1,...,k is the correct password, the adversary plays
the role of players Ui′+1 and Ui′+3 and follows the protocol using pwi as the
password. That is, he chooses random exponents xi′+1 and xi′+3, computes the
values zi′+1 = gxi′+1 and zi′+3 = gxi′+3, and then computes z⋆
i′+1 and z⋆
i′+3 from
zi′+1 and zi′+3 using pwi as the password. Let Xi′+2 be the value that the honest
user Ui′+2 outputs in the third round of our protocol. To verify if his guess pwi
for the password is the correct one, the adversary computes zi′+2 from z⋆
i′+2
using pwi as the password and checks whether z
xi′+3−xi′+1
i′+2 = Xi′+2. This should
be the case whenever pwi is equal to the actual password.
4.4 Computational Assumptions
Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption: DDH. The DDH assumption states
(roughly) that the distributions (gu,gv,guv) and (gu,gv,gw) are computation-
ally indistinguishable when u,v,w are indices chosen uniformly at random. This
can be made more precise by deﬁning two experiments, DDH
⋆ and DDH
$. In
experiment DDH
⋆, the inputs given to the adversary are U = gu, V = gv, and10 M. Abdalla et al.
W = guv, where u and v are two random indices. In experiment DDH
$, the
inputs given to the adversary are U = gu, V = gv, and W = gw, where u, v,
and w are random indices. The goal of the adversary is to guess a bit indicating
the experiment he thinks he is in. A (t,ǫ)-distinguisher against DDH for G is a
probabilistic Turing machine   with time-complexity t, which is able to distin-
guish these two distributions with an advantage Adv
ddh
G ( ) greater than ǫ. The
advantage function Adv
ddh
G (t) for the group G is then deﬁned as the maximum
value of Adv
ddh
G ( ) over all   with time-complexity at most t.
Parallel Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption: PDDH. We deﬁne a vari-
ant of the DDH problem, we name it the Parallel Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
problem, which is equivalent to the usual DDH problem. To this aim, we deﬁne
the two following distributions:
PDH
⋆
n = {gx1,...,gxn,gx1x2,...,gxn−1xn,gxnx1 |x1,...,xn ∈R Zq},
PDH
$
n = {gx1,...,gxn,gy1,...,gyn |x1,...,xn,y1,...,yn ∈R Zq}.
A (t,ǫ)-distinguisher against PDDHn for G is a probabilistic Turing ma-
chine   with time-complexity t, which is able to distinguish these two distribu-
tions with an advantage Adv
pddhn
G ( ) greater than ǫ. The advantage function
Adv
pddhn
G (t) for the group G, is then deﬁned as the maximum value of Adv
pddhn
G ( )
over all   with time-complexity at most t.
Lemma 4 (Equivalence between PDDHn and DDH) For any group G and
any integer n, the PDDHn and the DDH problems are equivalent: for any time
bound T,
Adv
ddh
G (T) ≤ Adv
pddhn
G (T) ≤ nAdv
ddh
G (T).
Proof. We omit the proof of this lemma in this version of the paper as it follows
from a standard hybrid argument [13,14] with n+1 hybrid experiments, in which
the ﬁrst i DDH values are replaced by random ones in the i-th hybrid experiment
for i ∈ {0,...,n}. In fact, a proof of this lemma was implicitly made in the
proceedings version of the paper by Katz and Yung in Crypto 2003 [15] when
showing an upper bound for the probability distance between the experiments
Faken and Real. Moreover, in the full version of their paper, they provide an even
tighter security reduction between these two problems.
In our security analysis, we will need a challenger that outputs a new tuple
either from PDH
⋆
n or PDH
$
n, according to an input bit. That is, we have a ﬁxed
bit β, and for any new query S, Chall
β(S) outputs a new tuple from PDH
⋆
n if
β = 0, or from PDH
$
n if β = 1. If the same S is queried again, then the same
output tuple is returned. It is a well-known result that after q queries to the
challenger, any adversary in time t cannot guess the bit β with advantage larger
than q × Adv
pddhn
G (t) ≤ qn × Adv
ddh
G (t).Password-based Group Key Exchange in a Constant Number of Rounds 11
5 Proof of Theorem 3
We proceed by deﬁning several experiments (or games), the ﬁrst one being the
real-world experiment (in which the success of the adversary in outputting b′ = b
— denoted by event S — is larger than (1+Adv
ake(A))/2 by deﬁnition), the last
one being a trivially secure experiment in which the success of the adversary is
straightforwardly 1/2.
Game G0: This is the real attack game, in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher
models.
Game G1: We simulate the random oracles G, H and Auth in a classical
way using the lists ΛG, ΛH and ΛAuth, with a random value for any new query,
and we cancel executions (by halting the simulation and declaring the adver-
sary successful) in which a collision occurs in the output of hash functions. The
probability of such bad event is upper-bounded by the birthday paradox.
￿ ￿Pr[S1] − Pr[S0]
￿ ￿ ≤
q2
G
2ℓG +
q2
H
2ℓH +
q2
Auth
2ℓAuth .
Game G2: In this game, we start to control the simulation of the ideal
cipher by maintaining a list Λ that keeps track of the previous queries-answers
and that links each query to a speciﬁc user. Members of the list Λ are of the
form (type,S,i,α,k,z,z⋆), where type ∈ {enc,dec}. Such record means that
Ek(z) = z⋆, and type indicates which kind of queries generated the record. The
index i indicates which player is associated with the key k, while S indicates the
session with which we are dealing. These values are both set to ⊥ if k does not
come from a H query of the form (S,i,∗) with i ∈ {1,...,n}, and S of any form.
The element α will be explained later.
– On encryption query Ek(z), we look for a record ( , , , ,k,z,∗) in Λ. If such a
record exists, we return its last component. Otherwise, we choose uniformly
at random z⋆ ∈ G, add (enc,⊥,⊥,⊥,k,z,z⋆) to Λ, and return z⋆.
– On decryption query Dk(z⋆), we look for a record ( , , , ,k,∗,z⋆) in Λ. If
such a record exists, we return its sixth component. Otherwise, we distinguish
two sub-cases, by looking up in ΛH if k has been returned to a hash query
of the form (S,i,∗): if it the case, we choose z at random in G⋆ = G\{0}
and update the list Λ with (dec,S,i,⊥,k,z,z⋆); otherwise, we choose z at
random in G⋆ and update the list Λ with (dec,⊥,⊥,⊥,k,z,z⋆). In both
cases, the decryption query on z⋆ is answered with z.
Such a simulation is perfect, except for the following three points. First, collisions
may appear that contradict the permutation property of the ideal-cipher: the
probability can be upper-bounded by (qE+qD)2/2|G|. Second, we avoided z being
equal to 1 in the decryption queries. Finally, in the case of the decryption query
simulation, one will cancel executions (by halting the simulation and declaring
the the adversary successful) if the value k (involved in a decryption query) is
output later by H. Fortunately, this happens with probability at most qH/2ℓH
for each decryption query. Intuitively, as it will become clear in the next games,12 M. Abdalla et al.
we indeed want to make sure that, for any k involved in a decryption query,
if k comes from a H query, we know the corresponding pair (S,i). All being
considered, such bad events are unlikely:
￿ ￿Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]
￿ ￿ ≤
(qE + qD)2
2|G|
+
qD
|G|
+
qHqD
2ℓH .
Game G3: In this game, we change the simulation of the decryption queries,
and make use of our challenger to embed an instance of the PDH problem in the
protocol simulation. In this game, we set β = 0, so that our challenger Chall
β( )
output tuples (ζ1,...,ζn,γ1,...,γn) according to the PDH
⋆
n distribution. We use
these (2n)-tuples to properly simulate the decryption queries.
More precisely, we issue a new tuple each time a new session S appears
in a decryption query. But if several queries are asked with the same S, the
challenger outputs the same tuple, so we will derive many related instances,
granted the random self-reducibility. The latter tells us that, given one tuple
outputted by the challenger, then for any randomly chosen (α1,...,αn), the
tuple (ζ
α1
1 ,...,ζαn
n ,γ
α1α2
1 ,...,γαnα1
n ) has the same distribution as the original
one.
We make use of this property as follows, by modifying the ﬁrst sub-case
previously considered for new decryption queries.
– On a new decryption query Dk(z⋆), such that k = H(S,i,∗) was previously
obtained from H for some valid index i, we query Chall
β(S) in order to
get a tuple (ζ1,...,ζn,γ1,...,γn). We then randomly choose α ∈ Z⋆
q, add
(dec,S,i,α,k,z = ζα
i ,z⋆) to Λ, and return z.
Above, we have deﬁned the list Λ whose elements are of the form (type,S,i,
α,k,z,z⋆). The component ’α’ now comes into play. This element is an exponent
indicating how we applied the random self-reducibility of the PDDH problem,
to the instance generated by the challenger upon the request S: X = ζα
i . Here,
the element α can only be deﬁned if S and i are known (in order to know which
tuple, and which ζi, we are working with.) If α is unknown to the simulator, we
set α = ⊥.
This change does not modify the view of the adversary, so: Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
Game G4: We are now ready to simulate the Send queries in a diﬀerent way,
but only in the second and third rounds: when the session S is deﬁned, user i
computes the symmetric keys as before kj = H(S,j,pw), for all j. We thus know
we are working with the tuple (ζ1,...,ζn,γ1,...,γn).
In the second round, Ui randomly chooses a value z⋆
i ∈ G to be broadcasted,
and asks zi = Dki(z⋆
i ), using the above simulation (which leads to add αi to the
list Λ, unless z⋆
i already appeared as an encryption result. But the latter event
cannot happen with probability greater than qE/|G|.)
In the third round, Ui recovers zi−1 = Dki−1(z⋆
i−1) and zi+1 = Dki+1(z⋆
i+1).
But then, two situations may appear:
– z⋆
i−1 and z⋆
i+1 have been simulated according to the above simulation of
the second round, and then one gets αi−1 and αi+1 in the list Λ such that
zi−1 = ζ
αi−1
i−1 and zi+1 = ζ
αi+1
i+1 ;Password-based Group Key Exchange in a Constant Number of Rounds 13
– one of the z⋆
j has been previously answered by the encryption oracle in
response to an attacker query Ek(z⋆), where k = H(S,j,pw) is the correct
key for player Uj in session S. We denote such an event by Encrypt. In such
a case, we stop the simulation, letting the adversary win.
If everything runs smoothly, one gets
zi = ζ
αi
i zi−1 = ζ
αi−1
i−1 zi+1 = ζ
αi+1
i+1 .
One can then correctly compute
Zi = CDH(zi−1,zi) = γ
αi−1αi
i−1 Zi+1 = CDH(zi,zi+1) = γ
αiαi+1
i .
One then broadcasts Xi = Zi+1/Zi. After this ﬁnal round, everybody can com-
pute the session key as before. The simulation is still perfect, unless the above
bad events happen:
￿ ￿Pr[S4] − Pr[S3]
￿ ￿ ≤
qEqpassive
|G|
+ Pr[Encrypt4] ≤
nqEqsession
|G|
+ Pr[Encrypt4].
Game G5: Since it is clear that the security of the above scheme still relies
on the DDH assumption, we now ﬂip the bit β to 1, in order to receive tuples
(ζ1,...,ζn,γ1,...,γn) according to the PDH
$
n distribution (in which the yi’s
denote the values logg γi).
￿ ￿Pr[S5] − Pr[S4]
￿ ￿ ≤ qsessionAdv
pddhn
G (t)
￿ ￿Pr[Encrypt5] − Pr[Encrypt4]
￿ ￿ ≤ qsessionAdv
pddhn
G (t).
Game G6: In order to stop active attacks, where the adversary forges ﬂows,
we modify the computation of the key conﬁrmations: we replace the function
Auth by a private one Auth
′: Authi = Auth
′(S,{z⋆
j,Xj}j,Ki,i), where
Ki = Zn
i X
n−1
i X
n−2
i+1    Xi+n−2 = γ
nαi−1αi
i−1 X
n−1
i X
n−2
i+1    Xi+n−2
= gn(αi−1αiyi−1)X
n−1
i X
n−2
i+1    Xi+n−2.
Let us list all the information a (powerful) adversary may have, from all the Xj
sent by Uj in the S-th session:
logXj = yj(αjαj+1) − yj−1(αj−1αj) = Ajyj − Aj−1yj−1.
As explained in [15], this does not leak any information about yi−1, since the
above system contains only n−1 independent equations with n unknowns. Any
value for yn−1 is thus possible and would determine all the other values.
Therefore, after this modiﬁcation, the probability for the adversary to see
the diﬀerence between the current and the previous experiments is to query
Auth(S,{z⋆
j,Xj}j,Ki,i), which is upper-bounded by qAuth/|G|.14 M. Abdalla et al.
￿ ￿Pr[S6] − Pr[S5]
￿ ￿ ≤
qAuth
|G|
￿ ￿Pr[Encrypt6] − Pr[Encrypt5]
￿ ￿ ≤
qAuth
|G|
.
Game G7: Finally, we now derive the session keys using a private ran-
dom oracle G′: ski = G′(S,{z⋆
j,Xj,Authj}j). As above, after the modiﬁcation
of the derivation of the session key, the probability for the adversary to see
the diﬀerence between the current and the previous experiments is to query
G(S,{z⋆
j,Xj,Authj}j,Ki). Since the previous game, we know that inside each
session, all the honest users have the same view, and thus theses queries are
identical: the probability of such an event can also be upper-bounded by qG/|G|,
since no information has been leaked about Ki (except it does not correspond
to the Auth queries asked above.)
￿
￿Pr[S7] − Pr[S6]
￿
￿ ≤
qG
|G| − qAuth
≤
2qG
|G|
￿ ￿Pr[Encrypt7] − Pr[Encrypt6]
￿ ￿ ≤
qG
|G| − qAuth
≤
2qG
|G|
.
Furthermore, because the private oracle G′ is private to the simulator, it is
clear that
Pr[S7] =
1
2
.
Game G8: In order to conclude the proof, we need to upper-bound the event
Encrypt7. One can note that the password pw is only used in the simulation of
the second and third rounds, to compute zi, zi−1 and zi+1 (using the elements
ζi, ζi−1 and ζi+1), but eventually, we output Xi only, which are computed from
the γi−1 and γi. The latter is totally independent of the former.
We can thus simplify the simulation of the second and third rounds: In the
second round, Ui randomly chooses z⋆
i ∈ G, and sends it (this is exactly as
before.) However no decryption is needed. In the third round, Ui simply computes
and sends Xi = γi/γi−1 (this is just to make sure that the product of the Xi is
equal to 1, but we just need random elements satisfying this relation, since they
do not appear anywhere else.) This is a perfect simulation, since one does not
need anymore to compute Ki.
At this point, the password is never used, and can thus be chosen at the very
end only, which makes clear that probability of the Encrypt event is less than the
number of ﬁrst ﬂows manufactured by the adversary, divided by N. The latter
part is upper-bounded by qactive:
Pr[Encrypt7] = Pr[Encrypt8] ≤ qactive/N.
In the above, we used the fact that collisions in the output of H have been
eliminated in previous games.
Putting all equations together, one easily gets the announced bound.Password-based Group Key Exchange in a Constant Number of Rounds 15
6 Conclusion
We described a constant-round password-based key exchange protocol for group,
derived from the Burmester-Desmedt scheme. The protocol is proven secure
against dictionary attacks under the DDH assumption, in the ideal-cipher and
random oracle models. It remains an open problem to ﬁnd a scheme whose
security depends on the number of active sessions rather than on the number of
manufactured ﬂows.
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